sovereign assumption to prevent officials of that school district from escaping remedial measures. When such links are shown, recent decisions suggest that courts may properly presume that state action has also distorted the processes of local educational decisionmaking. Part III analyzes the problems of proving causation and discriminatory intent that arise in actual application of this "housing approach."
I. THE PRESENT STATUS OF BASING SCHOOL DESEGREGATION REMEDIES ON OFFICIAL HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
Although no claims of housing discrimination were before the Court in Milliken, Justice Stewart asserted in a concurring opinion that housing or zoning discrimination could justify interdistrict school desegregation relief. 5 This statement remains the only clear endorsement by a Supreme Court Justice of the housing approach to school desegregation.
Since 1974, federal courts in Wilmington and Indianapolis have partially based interdistrict school remedies on housing violations. In Wilmington, the court found that the municipal housing authority had jurisdiction to establish publicly assisted housing projects up to five miles beyond the city limits, but as of 1972 had located fewer than forty of two thousand units outside the city limits. 6 This practice concentrated poor and minority families inside Wilmington. 7 The court's finding that this practice intensified segregation in schools throughout the metropolitan area helped to justify a sweeping eleven-district remedy. ' In Indianapolis, the municipal housing agency's area of operation similarly extended five miles beyond the city limits in all directions. 9 All 10. Most of these projects consisted of single-family apartment units, and of these, 98% of the occupants were blacks. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 637 F.2d at 1109. Cir. 1974) , aff'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975). 14. See Ybarra v. City of San Jose, 503 F.2d 1041 (9th Cir. 1974 ) (finding improper dismissal of suit by lower court where plaintiffs' case rested on "a legal principle so unsettled" as the claim that zoning and building permit policies might justify school desegregation relief); Reed v. Rhodes, 422 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ohio 1976 ) (Reed I) (ordering desegregation based on violations by school board but stressing that school policies should be seen in context of segregated public housing), later proceeding, 581 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1978) , aff'd in part, 607 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1979 Cir. ), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 935 (1980 . In Chicago, the recent approval of an intradistrict remedy specifically attributed the perpetuation of segregation in the city's schools to the continuing failure of housing authorities to counteract residential segregation. United States v. Board of Educ., 554 F. Supp. 912, 913 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (approving consent decree) (" [B] ecause racial patterns in a neighborhood school system obviously mirror racial housing patterns, the continuing delinquencies of the City of Chicago's administrations in not taking steps to arrest the growth, let alone change the pattern, of defacto segregation in housing were major contributors to the problem.").
15. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 1299 , 1304 (W.D.N.C. 1969 ), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 431 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1970 ), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 402 U.S. 1 (1971 , the trial court found that school segregation resulted from myriad forms of state action: zoning, city planning, urban renewal, public housing siting, and restrictive covenants. The Supreme Court did not address these findings. 402 U.S. 1, 23 (1971) . 16. See cases cited supra notes 6 (Wilmington), 9 (Indianapolis), 12 (Kalamazoo), 13 (Coney Island), 14 (Cleveland), and infra note 21 (St. Louis).
17. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 755 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring). See supra note 5.
for relief," 8 others take the suggestion as merely an "offhand remark." 1 No court has relied on the housing approach exclusively or even primarily. In cases in which housing violations have influenced the terms of a school desegregation remedy, courts have always found discrimination in education as well. 2 0 The St. Louis litigation promised to provide a precedent for interdistrict relief heavily dependent on evidence of metropolitan area-wide housing discrimination, but the parties settled. " The Supreme U.S. 963 (1975) . "Manipulation" may mean failure to change district boundaries as political boundaries change. For example, Indianapolis, Louisville and Kansas City have predominantly black inner city school districts whose boundaries have been prevented from expanding as the cities have grown. Kansas City now contains all or part of thirteen school districts. The inner city Kansas City Munidpal School District was originally contiguous with the city limits but was prevented from expanding after the late 1950's and is now predominantly black while the other districts are predominantly white. M. Wise, D. Field & S. Dougherty, Proposed Intervention in Black v. Missouri, Memorandum Submitted to R. Rheinstein, Chief, General Litigation Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice 37-38 (1980) (on file with Yale Law Journal). See Newburg Area Council v. Board of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358, 1361 (6th Cir. 1974 ) (confinement of Louisville school district to inner city core allows 10,000 mostly white students living inside city to attend county schools), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975).
21. The agreement to settle provided St. Louis County with the nation's first comprehensive, voluntarily enacted busing program between a large city and its suburbs. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1983 , at Al, col. 5. All but one of the county's 23 school districts agreed to participate in a plan calling for busing 15,000 black students from the city to suburban schools. Id. The settlement grew out of prolonged litigation that had already resulted in a court-imposed intradistrict remedy within the city of St. Louis, based solely on the failure of school officials to desegregate after 1954. See Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1291-97 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826 (1980). However, the court of appeals indicated that all governmental policies tending to promote segregation could be important in determining whether to order interdistrict relief. Adams v. United States, 620 F.2d at 1291, 1294 & Court, meanwhile, continues to emphasize the limits on the equitable remedial powers of the lower courts necessitated by federalism and local self-determination. 2 2
The courts have, in effect, experimented with the housing approach for nine years since Milliken. 28 The attraction of basing claims on the violations of housing officials is not only that it can justify broad metropolitan relief, but also that it focuses the attention of the courts on the causes of residential segregation, which is the fundamental source of contemporary school segregation.
II. SCHOOL SEGREGATION BY NON-SCHOOL OFFICIALS AND THE

SINGLE-SOVEREIGN ASSUMPTION
A. Evasive Schemes and the Single-Sovereign Assumption
At first sight, the housing approach seems inconsistent with Milliken. If purposeful racial discrimination by school officials in District X is insufficient under Milliken to justify court-ordered desegregation remedies in District Y, purposeful racial discrimination by state housing officials arguably also falls short of justifying remedies in District Y.
The Milliken bar to interdistrict relief, however, applies only where the segregative effects of the violations by District X's school officials are conn.27. Housing violations and other state actions promoting residential segregation were an important part of the plaintiffs' case in the proceedings considering the motion for interdistrict relief prior to the settlement agreement of February 22, 1983. See Brief for Defendant 7-11, Liddell v. Board of Educ., No. 72-100-C(4) (E.D. Mo. 1982 ) (discussing addition of housing and land use authorities for interdistrict phase of litigation). The housing approach is a part of the plaintiffs' strategy in suits brought by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in Kansas City, Missouri, and by the U.S. Department of Justice in Yonkers, New York. The Kansas City litigation has entered a new phase following court-ordered realignment of the parties and dismissal of Kansas defendants. School Dist. v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Mo. 1978 ) (rejecting defendants' motion for summary dismissal that claimed, inter alia, legal insufficiency in plaintiffs' allegation that federal housing, highway and educational agencies caused school segregation), appeal dismissed, 592 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1979 24 The availability of relief in District Y is therefore not necessarily contingent upon a showing of discrimination by school officials in District Y. This exception arguably involves no disjunction between violation and remedy, since the violators and the appliers of the remedy are all agents of the education bureaucracy of the state government. Similarly, the Milliken exception countenances the housing approach, since the violators and the appliers of the remedy are all agents of the same state government. 25 Milliken itself thus provides some basis for the housing approach.
Although Justice Stewart did not cite them, there are cases supporting the housing approach. 2 " As the federal courts became attuned to the sophisticated "evasive schemes" available to states bent on avoiding desegregation, the courts developed the argument that a disjunction between violation and remedy of the type involved in the housing approach is overcome by a showing that an arm of the state caused school segregation.
In 34 In Milliken, the Court found violations only by the Detroit school board. 3 5 Apart from those violations, the state had not created the dual school system. Plaintiffs relied on theories of agency and vicarious liability to assert that state school officials were responsible for the wrongdoing of the Detroit board. Such a rationale, however, would justify not merely the metropolitan remedy sought by the plaintiffs, but a statewide one. The Court therefore rejected these theories as violating the rule of equity that a remedy must not exceed the extent of the violation. 8
By contrast, the housing approach is limited in two ways. It does not justify expansion of the remedy beyond the geographical area of operation of the housing authority or other governmental entity found guilty of constitutional violations. Further, the scope of the remedy is limited to the extent to which official housing discrimination demonstrably caused school segregation. Consequently, the housing approach is consistent with the agency principle that seeks to prevent local agents of the state from escaping participation in remedies for their own wrongdoing. 
B. The Rationale for the Single-Sovereign Assumption is Fragmentation of Authority, Not Danger of a Conspiracy
A possible objection to finding support for the housing approach in the evasive schemes cases would be that housing-approach cases do not allege deliberate conspiracies or collusion between housing and school officials. Court opinions in two of the intradistrict housing approach cases stressed that school officials were aware of housing decisions and policies.
38 However, the evasive schemes cases are devoid of language suggesting that courts must find active cooperation between governmental entities before the entities will be treated as arms of the same sovereign. Indeed, in Cooper v. Aaron, the Court conceded the "good faith" efforts of the Little Rock School Board to integrate the city's schools.
39
C. The Requirement of a Causal Connection
Plaintiffs relying on the housing approach must show a causal connection between the unconstitutional actions of state housing officials and the 430-31 (1971 It might be possible to show collusion in some cases were it deemed necessary. In the Cleveland intradistrict case, for example, the court found not only that school officials agreed to erect schools to serve all-black housing projects, but also that assurances of the availability of adequate classroom space were prerequisites to federal funding of the projects. See Reed I, 422 F. Supp. at 789.
39. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1958) ; id. at 21 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The Kalamazoo decision suggests a much looser version of this purely hypothetical collusion requirement for desegregation relief-a showing that school officials knew of the discriminatory actions of housing officials, or (looser still) should have known. The Kalamazoo district court apparently assumed wrongly that one or the other of these two conditions had to be shown. The opinion stresses the Kalamazoo School Board's "intimate knowledge" of residential areas in the city and "extensive knowledge" of the way public agencies, as well as private groups functioned. Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 368 F. Supp. at 184-85. Consequently, the court held the school board liable for failure to counteract school segregation resulting from official housing decisions. Id. at 185.
Similarly, in the Cleveland case, the district court used the evidence of official housing discrimination partly to demonstrate an intent to discriminate on the part of school officials. The court could not lend credence to the school board's claim that its neighborhood school policy was racially neutral, because many schools were built to serve housing projects that were racially identifiable from their inception. Reed 1, 422 F. Supp. at 790. This use of housing discrimination evidence to shed light on the discriminatory intent of school officials is an alternate justification for school desegregation remedies independent of the housing approach, because it does not depend on activation of the single-sovereign assumption. If there were a requirement that school officials know of the discriminatory impact of housing policies, it probably would not be a significant obstacle for the housing approach inasmuch as it is hard to imagine a school board without the level of public awareness the court found in the Kalamazoo case. But such a requirement need not be fulfilled. The single-sovereign theory does not exist, or does not only exist, as an antidote to the threat of conscious cooperation by agents of the state. It follows necessarily from the language of the equal protection clause (" [N] or shall any State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added)) and serves as an antidote to the institutionalized compartmentalization of authority inherent in state governments which often makes it difficult to pin the blame for some kinds of Fourteenth Amendment violations on any one agency. racial composition of the schools in the district where desegregation remedies are sought. Unless this requirement is met, defendants could easily distinguish the evasive schemes cases, in which the causal connection is always obvious. More fundamentally, satisfaction of the requirement is dictated by the Supreme Court's doctrine that equitable remedies may not exceed what is necessary to undo the effects of the violation."' A school remedy for housing violations is therefore permissible only to the extent that the violation caused school segregation.
Many court opinions reveal a general assumption or unverified hypothesis that the causes of modern urban segregation are primarily nongovernmental. A finding of effective state action depends on how the finder of fact weighs the various causes of segregation, but such opinions assume a weighing that leaves little or no room for state action as a cause. On the Supreme Court, several Justices take the view that voluntary migration, economic circumstances, and perhaps differing rates of birth among the races have caused school segregation. 4 Some lower court judges share these beliefs. 4 2 This attitude toward the causes of contemporary urban segregation inhibits imposition of judicial remedies because the courts cannot issue injunctions to counteract demographic and economic change. No one questions that residential segregation causes school segregation. Social scientists and the Court also agree to the converse proposition: School segregation promotes residential segregation." In recognizing the reciprocal influence of different forms of segregation, however, courts have tended to close discussion before they address the real issue: the extent to which state action, rather than private discrimination or demographic and economic factors, causes residential segregation.
Social science research has for years offered conclusions at odds with the non-responsibility of government hypothesis, 44 and the evidence continues to mount. Private volition becomes a less plausible explanation for segregated neighborhoods as both blacks and whites become more favorably disposed towards integrated neighborhoods. 45 Moreover, a broad na-43. School segregation contributes to residential segregation in three important ways. First, families deciding where to live often take the racial composition of local schools into account. Second, public housing authorities often will not site units until school officials have agreed to provide educational facilities. Third, private developers of segregated housing often promise to dedicate land to a school board in a new subdivision that agrees to erect a school on the land. 1963, 1970, 1972, and 1976) . Whites leave areas only when they fear their neighborhoods and schools will become overwhelmingly black. See C. RossEL., ASSESSING THE UNINTENDED IMPACTS OF PUB-LIC POLICY: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND RESEGREGATION (1978) (substantial white flight occurs only in school districts more than 35% black); D. Taylor, supra, at 32, 34 (white reaction to neighborhood integration depends primarily on the amount of integration they believe will eventually occur). tional consensus has developed in support of integrated education. 4 Social scientists also agree that only interdistrict school integration over a wide metropolitan area will effectively reduce the incentive for white flight and stabilize residential integration. 47 The theory that blacks do not move to the suburbs because they cannot afford to has also been discredited. Blacks have made great economic strides since World War II, but they have been unable to move out of the ghettos in great numbers. Blacks generally have greater difficulty than whites in finding suburban housing. 48 Where black movement into the suburbs has occurred, it has usually taken the form either of tentacle-like Recent research has also confirmed that white flight from neighborhoods and schools significantly increases during at least the first year of an intradistrict school desegregation remedy. 47. There is a growing consensus that intradistrict busing causes substantial immediate white flight. See supra note 45. There seems to be equal agreement among social scientists that a metropolitan remedy drastically reduces or eliminates white flight. For expressions of this latter view from scholars with varied attitudes toward busing, see House Desegregation Hearings, supra note 24, at 160-61 (statement of G. Orfield), 194, [198] [199] [200] [201] [202] [203] (statement of D. Pearce) (demonstrating empirically that broad metropolitan remedies remove the incentives for whites to move), 216 (statement of D. Armor), 220 (statement of C. Rossell); Senate School Busing Hearings, supra note 46, at 232 (statement of R. Farley). For a specific study of the impact of an interdistrict remedy on white flight, see J. 1, 5-6 (1979) . extensions of the inner city ghetto (e.g., East Cleveland) or of a new minighetto (e.g., Pontiac, Michigan). 49 On average, blacks still make less money than whites. 50 However, as recent work on census data shows, most suburbs are closed to blacks no matter what their incomes. 51 Nor are blacks misinformed about the availability of suburban housing."' The view that government is significantly responsible for residential segregation in American cities is therefore not a tentative hypothesis among social scientists, nor the subject of significant controversy. 58 It is possible to be overly pessimistic about the impotence of this research to affect judicial outcomes." Unlike most arguments in legal briefs, social science evidence works gradually over time to change judges' perceptions about social reality. 5 
RAFFEL, THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL
53.
To dramatize their consensus, thirty-seven prominent social scientists signed a "Social Science Statement" on school and residential segregation published in 1980. Among the chief assertions of this unusual manifesto is a forceful statement of governmental responsibility for residential segregation. See Orfield, supra note 43, at 233-34 ("Thus will past discriminatory practices of the FHA and other housing agencies continue for decades to come to exert an influence on the racial structure of the nation's metropolitan areas."); see also G. ORFIELD, supra note 45, at 408-09; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 48, at 167-68 (criticizing federal government's role in causing residential segregation). The authors originally drafted the statement in support of the Columbus and Dayton desegregation suits before the Supreme Court, apparently to counteract the tendency of courts to discount social science studies on the grounds of inconclusiveness or disagreement among scholars.
54 it may be cause for some hope that no Justice has espoused the nonresponsibility of government hypothesis in print since 1980."'
D. Local Control of Education
The Milliken Court stressed the damage such court orders purportedly do to local control and autonomy in educational decisionmaking. 8 In Hills v. Gautreaux, 59 the Court held that Milliken allows courts to order remedies beyond the municipal boundaries where the constitutional violation occurred. Milliken only limits the power of the courts to interfere with the operation of local governmental entities not implicated in unconstitutional conduct. 6 0 In Hills, Milliken posed no obstacle to a metropolitan housing remedy because housing had not been the responsibility of local governmental entities. 61 In devising school desegregation remedies, however, the courts must take into account the interests of local authorities in managing their own affairs. 6 " In fact, the Hills Court explained that even clear evidence of constitutional violations by state officials might not justify interdistrict school desegregation relief where the state educational structure vests substantial independence in local school districts. 6 3 Even if metropolitan remedies are reconcilable with local control, e 6 concern for (apart from ensuring that students are assigned to schools in a nondiscriminatory way, there would be no need to centralize authority over other aspects of educational process); W. Taylor, Metropolitan Remedies for Public School Discrimination, 10 URE. REV. 188-89 (1978) (decisions about hiring faculty and administrators, about curriculum and budget can remain highly localized and coexist with interdistrict student assignment)..
On the specific example of the Wilmington remedy, compare Delaware State Bd. of Educ. v. Evans, 446 U.S. 923, 923 (1980) (Evans VIII) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (Wilmington remedy labeled "more Draconian than any ever approved by this Court") with J. RAFFEL, supra note 47, at 195, 210-14 (stressing relative success of Wilmington remedy because of broad, active community participation in planning and implementing desegregative measures) and Raffel, supra note 47, at 64, 71 (popular dissatisfaction with public education results as much from county's failure to solve administrative problems as from busing and student reassignment). local control will restrict both the scope and the type of relief that the courts will grant. 6 5 Until 1982, the Supreme Court's formulations of the local control issue essentially created a presumption in favor of the status quo and functioned as restraints on the exercise of judicial remedial power to affect public education.
6 6 However, in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 167 and Crawford v. Board of Education," 8 the Court may have signaled a shift in emphasis away from protection of local decisionmaking from outside interference and toward protection of the integrity of the processes by which communities exercise self-determination in educational decisionmaking. The Court seemed eager to reinforce representative and participatory principles in school district governance, rather than simply to preserve the existing distribution of authority. 6 9 This concern with the processes of local control has been present in Court decisions for a long time, 70 but not so visibly as now. Concern for process and concern for the substance of local control do not always dictate the same remedial approach. Protection of processes represents a restraint on judicial power but does not automatically justify the status quo.
Milliken provides an illustration of the difference. There the Court offered local control as a reason for rejecting interdistrict relief.", It is difficult to justify that decision as reinforcing representative principles in local decisionmaking processes. School officials were not blamed for residential segregation, but the Detroit metropolitan area was nevertheless divided into nearly all-black and nearly all-white school districts. 7 The pervasive segregation in the schools was in no sense a product of democratic processes. As in the nation as a whole, the majority of the population of 65. One court has cited concern for local control as a reason for favoring busing or student transfers over redrawing district lines. See United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101, 1114 (7th Cir.) (remedy most closely tailored to violation would be to expand boundaries of inner city school district to city lines, but this "would have been far more intrusive into local political processes"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 838 (1980). It may not be constitutional for courts to order interstate school desegregation remedies in metropolitan areas that straddle state lines, especially where two states had interstate compacts in the domain of public education. But cf School Dist. v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. 421, 431, 435 (W.D. Mo. 1978 ) (claim in school segregation case that Kansas City, Kansas, defendants had maintained climate of discrimination forcing blacks to resettle in Kansas City, Missouri, held insufficient to invoke Missouri long-arm statute), appeal dismissed, 592 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1979 Where a significant causal connection can be established between state housing decisions and school segregation, a court's concern for the integrity of local processes should create a presumption that favors the housing approach rather, than the status quo. Such a showing indicates that state action has skewed the racial composition of school district electorates. In this respect, the corrupting impact of housing discrimination on local decisionmaking processes is analogous to that of racial gerrymandering.
5
Moreover, such a showing means that the decision about whether to have integrated schools has been partially or entirely removed to another, more distant level of government, the housing bureaucracy, which is not directly responsive to local or popular will. In this respect, the effect of housing discrimination resembles that of the unconstitutional Seattle anti-busing law.
The Court's concern for local processes suggests that when state action distorts the racial composition of school board electorates, redrawing district lines as a remedial measure has advantages over busing or student transfers. Such a remedy would counteract segregation not only in schools, but in elections of school boards. Ronald Dworkin believes that desegregation decisions have often been intended not simply as a cure for past violations but as prophylactics to counteract the high probability of racism in certain governmental decisionmaking processes. 76 Redrawing school district lines to remedy housing violations would both integrate the schools and correct the systematic corruption of school board elections.
III. APPLICATION OF THE HOUSING APPROACH
A. The Extent of the Violation
Swann and its progeny indicate that the scope of the remedy in a school desegregation case may not exceed the nature and extent of the violation. 1 73. See Farley, Bianchi & Colasanto, supra note 45, at 105 (1976 study of whites in Detroit area showed only 6% would feel "very uncomfortable" with one black per 13 whites in their neighborhood, only 15% with three blacks per 11 whites, and only 29% with five blacks per nine whites).
74. Like the Milliken majority opinion, Justice Powell's dissent in Seattle expressed the substantive side of the Court's concern for local control. Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 102 S. Ct. 3187, 3204-11 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell insisted several times that the case concerned structural and substantive authority, and he charged the majority with intruding on the rights of states to structure the decisionmaking operations of their local units. Id. at 3205, 3207, 3208, 3209, 3210 n.14, 3211 & n.17 (Powell, J., dissenting).
75. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (striking down a redrawing of city lines that disenfranchised a disproportionately large number of blacks for purposes of municipal elections).
76. See Dworkin, supra note 55, at 11.
77
. See, e.g., Milliken v In the late 1970's, however, it appeared that the "incremental segregative effect" requirement of Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (Dayton J)82 might severely restrict this discretion. This requirement calls for untangling many complicated and interwoven strands of cause and effect, sorting out those state actions with identifiable segregative impact, and devising a remedy to cure only the segregation caused by state actions. 8 ' Rigid application of this rule could effectively bar relief through the housing approach, for housing discrimination is inherently an indirect cause of school segregation, and many significant forms of official housing discrimination are as diffuse and intangible as they are pervasive.
However, it now appears unlikely for two reasons that Dayton I will constitute a significant obstacle to the housing approach. First, the Su- 
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preme Court apparently does not intend the test to apply to cases involving de jure segregation."' Second, even for cases of de facto segregation, the courts may not apply the Dayton I test with such rigor as to thwart the housing approach. In the Indianapolis case, the court stated that some constitutional violations found by the court had effects that "cannot be demonstrated statistically" but concluded that "it is reasonable to infer a moderate indirect effect." 8 5 The court also demonstrated that the incremental effect standard could be applied to housing violations. 8 8
B. Showing Causation
In the Wilmington and Indianapolis cases, the housing evidence mainly involved public housing siting decisions. Such' evidence permits the courts to say with precision how many black families were concentrated in the ghetto and would have been integrated into other residential areas had public housing been more evenly dispersed. Until at least the 1960's, public housing agencies tended to concentrate housing projects in large American cities 8 7 and maintain separate waiting lists by race to perpetuate seg-84. Id. at 410 n.4 (noting that racially segregated schools had been illegal in Ohio since 1888).
Dayton I left open the possibility that, in de jure cases, meeting the standards of Swann and Keyes would suffice because a de jure school system is presumed to be segregated throughout, not merely incrementally. This possibility was tested when the Wilmington district court issued its remedial plans. That court stated it was "fully cognizant" that the plans were formulated without "exacting consideration" of whether they would return schools to the position they would have been in but for the violations of housing and school officials. Evans v. Buchanan, 447 F. Supp. 982, 1009 (D. Del.) (Evans VIII), affid, 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978 Cir. ), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980 . On review, the court of appeals conceded that no Dayton I inquiry had been undertaken by the district court but excused this omission on the grounds that Wilmington had previously been subject to de jure segregation. Evans VIII, 582 F.2d at 763-64 (case distinguished from Dayton I on grounds that Delaware law mandated school segregation until 1954). Justice Rehnquist protested that the Court had never exempted cases of de jure segregation from the Dayton I inquiry. 446 U.S. at 925 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). In the Indianapolis suit, the Seventh Circuit similarly concluded that no Dayton I inquiry was needed because school segregation had been sanctioned by a state law preventing expansion of the inner city school district as the city grew. S. 838 (1980) . 86. Before deciding that the incremental segregative effect standard was irrelevant, the Seventh Circuit had remanded the case for application of the Dayton I inquiry. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 573 F.2d. 400, 414 (7th Cir.) (urging district court "explicitly" to consider Dayton I test). On remand, the district court provided an example of the sensible application of the incremental effect standard to housing violations in a housing-approach case. Having determined the precise number of black pupils (4,958) concentrated in the inner city school district by public housing siting decisions, the court ordered that a roughly 60% greater number of students (8,000 to 8,500) participate in the interdistrict transfer remedy, reasoning that there tends to be some movement of blacks into private housing around public housing sites. Courts can also rely on evidence that does not permit such easy quantification. The pre-Milliken Kalamazoo decision rested heavily on the lingering effects of state-enforced restrictive covenants. 9 Use of this kind of evidence requires plaintiffs to provide a historical perspective on the development of racial concentration, in order to demonstrate the link between current patterns of segregation and former official practices. The same is true of evidence that federal mortgage and loan guarantee programs administered by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Veterans Administration (VA) promoted residential segregation. Several courts have taken note of this phenomenon. 1 For years, the FHA and VA refused to provide financing for blacks who wanted to move out of the ghetto.
9 2 The notorious FHA Underwriters Manual made perpetuation of segregation a matter of ethics for real estate brokers." State governments have fre-quently failed, and still do fail, to use their licensing powers against realtors who discriminate. 9 "
Although they are not arms of the state, federal agencies can be joined as defendants along with state agencies or ordered to participate in remedies on grounds of privity. 95 The nature of HUD's involvement in local housing projects makes privity easy to demonstrate." Some other forms of state action have not influenced school desegregation decisions, so far as the published opinions reveal. These include practices of agencies not directly responsible for housing. For example, explicitly racial zoning ordinances have been unconstitutional since 1917,"' but remained on the books in many places until the 1950's." 8 Siting decisions for highways and other public works projects have also often promoted racial concentration or served to demarcate racial areas. 99 
C. Showing Discriminatory Intent
In 1976 and 1977, the Supreme Court defined strict standards for showing discriminatory intent in equal protection cases. 100 The impact of these requirements on the housing approach was soon tested: The Indianapolis school desegregation case was one of five which the Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of the new standards. 0 1 On remand, the district court set aside all of the evidence of housing discrimination except the public housing siting decisions. From the siting decisions alone, however, the court found proof of discriminatory intent in a combination of circumstantial evidence, foreseeability of consequences, and the absence of credible alternative explanations for siting. 0 2 Thus, the Indianapolis case has withstood the new tests.
The Supreme Court's refusal to review the Indianapolis decision leaves standing the use of housing discrimination evidence in a school desegregation case, but it also leaves some questions unanswered. Perhaps the refusal only represents the Court's deference to the trial court's findings of fact on the issue of intent. 1 0 On the other hand, the Court may be retreating from the strict standards of purposiveness laid down in 1976 and 1977. A recent voting rights case decided under the equal protection clause reconfirmed the value of circumstantial evidence for determination of intent. 1 0 The best evidence of leniency in applying the equal protection intent standard to school desegregation cases comes from two 1979 intradistrict school desegregation cases which saw the Court recognize that intent may be embedded in institutional practices and attenuated over time, and that foreseeable discriminatory impact provides evidence of discriminatory intent. 10 5 In general, the federal courts have applied the intent requirement leniently in school desegregation cases, perhaps because the courts are relatively more familiar with the complex and oblique strategies used to preserve school segregation. 106 Thus, it is not surprising that the Indianapolis decision has survived. Although the housing approach requires the fact finder to inquire into the purposes of housing officials, it should logically benefit from any tendency on the part of the courts to conduct that inquiry with due allowances for the subtlety state and local government entities have shown in promoting segregation in schools.
CONCLUSION
Interdistrict school desegregation relief should be available whenever a court finds that governmental housing decisions have contributed significantly to metropolitan-wide school segregation. Such a finding should activate an assumption that state agencies act as arms of a single sovereign. Such a finding should also create a presumption that state action has skewed the processes of local educational decisionmaking. Findings of fact in particular cases, along with social science evidence, have eroded the non-responsibility of government rationale that courts have offered for resisting the housing approach to school desegregation relief. Doctrinal obstacles like the "incremental segregative effect" and discriminatory intent requirements no longer appear insuperable. The housing approach still presents problems, but it holds far more promise today than it did in the late 1970's.
-Robert R. Harding of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464-65, 467-68 (1979) .
106. For the argument that the intent standard should be applied more leniently in school desegregation cases than in other areas of equal protection law, see Sullivan, The Intent Requirement in Desegregation Cases: The Inapplicability of Washington v. Davis, 10 J.L. & EDUC. 325, 329-30 (1981) (effects of school segregation are psychologically debilitating, and states have special responsibilities in area of public education).
